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HIT AND RUN STRIKES-PROTECTED ACTIVITY




THE RAILWAY LABOR Act (RLA)' is one of the more
arcane statutes governing labor relations. Because of
the limited number of employers subject to the RLA, few
practitioners, and even fewer judges, understand its pur-
pose and properly interpret its provisions. In recent
times, most people have heard about the RLA in connec-
tion with labor disputes in the airline industry.
In the past year, two airline labor disputes have high-
lighted the problems with interpreting the RLA and de-
termining which actions by unions should be given
protected status and which should be prohibited. In June
of 1993, the flight attendants at Alaska Airlines obtained
the right to strike. However, instead of calling for a gen-
eral strike, in which all flight attendants would walk off the
job, the union initiated a campaign to "Create Havoc
Around Our System", 2 referred to as CHAOS. This cam-
paign consisted of intermittent and sporadic work stop-
pages at unpredictable times.
The second dispute involved American Airlines flight
* The author is a shareholder with True Rohde & Sewell in Dallas, Texas and is
a board certified labor law practitioner. Prior to joining True Rohde & Sewell,
Moore served as in-house counsel for American Airlines for more than five years.
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
2 Association of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines, No. C93-912R, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18938, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 29, 1993).
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attendants who walked off the job just prior to
Thanksgiving Day. If President Clinton had not forced
the carrier to commit to arbitration and end the strike, the
strike would have lasted only a few more days. In addi-
tion, the union indicated that they might call additional
general strikes in the future. Whether or not this inter-
mittent activity would have been illegal was never
determined.
In order to properly analyze the legitimacy of intermit-
tent and partial strikes under the RLA, it is necessary to
review the legislative history of the RLA and the decisions
under the National Labor Relations Act 3 (NLRA), the la-
bor statute applicable to most other employers in the
United States. Although decisions under the NLRA are
not automatically applicable to the RLA, many of those
decisions analyze concepts that arise under both statutes,
and the courts frequently rely upon previous NLRA deci-
sions to guide them in the interpretation of the RLA.
Based upon this review, a strong argument must be
made that intermittent and partial strikes should gain no
protection under the RLA. Furthermore, employers
should be free to discipline or discharge employees who
engage in such activity and should be free to obtain in-
junctive relief to enable them to continue to operate in a
manner consistent with that required by the authors of the
RLA.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE RLA
In the late 1800s, the railroads performed a critical
function in this country and it was essential that uninter-
rupted service be provided. One of the most common in-
terruptions about which the country was concerned were
strikes by one or more railroad unions. As early as 1888,
legislation was passed aimed at preventing labor unions
from severely disrupting the economy. This, and many
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
4 Arbitration Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 501 (1888).
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other legislative attempts, however, failed to ensure that
labor disputes were settled short of strikes.5
In 1922, after a particularly devastating national strike,
President Harding, in an attempt to force Congress to
pass more meaningful legislation declared "the law creat-
ing the Railroad Labor Board is inadequate .... It cannot
halt a strike....- 6 Although many bills were submitted to
Congress after President Harding's plea, none became
law.
After many frustrating attempts to pass a law to prevent
strikes more effectively in the industry, the representatives
of labor and management met and drafted legislation to
which they could both agree. The result was the RLA,
which has been described as a "product of negotiations
and conferences between a representative committee" of
labor and management.7 The bill was passed by Congress
with very few changes.
The RLA defined several general duties, the first being:
[T]he duty of all carriers, their officers, agents and em-
ployees to exert every reasonable effort to make and main-
tain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and
working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether
arising out of the application of such agreements or other-
wise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to
the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute
between the carrier and the employees thereof.'
It is clear, based upon the legislative history, the exper-
iences under the previous statutes, and President Har-
ding's comments, that the primary purpose of the RLA
was to avoid strikes. It is interesting to note, however,
that the RLA does not contain the word "strike." While
the RLA implies that a union will have the right to strike
after exhausting all of the procedures contained in the
5 See Erdman Law, 30 Stat. 424 (1898); Newlands Law, 38 Stat. 103 (1913);
Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
6 62 CONG. REC. 214 (1922).
, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 328, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926).
8 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
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RLA designed to have the parties reach agreement, it
never specifically grants labor organizations the right to
strike.9
Despite the wide support the RLA received from the
carriers, there were some that attempted to circumvent
the Board of Mediation, set up in the RLA, by creating
company unions to represent employees. In finding that a
carrier violated the RLA by negotiating only with a com-
pany union, the Supreme Court held not only that the
courts had jurisdiction over RLA disputes, but that the
rights granted the parties under the RLA were judicially
enforceable. 10
Even after the Texas & New Orleans decision, carriers
continued to encourage the formation of company un-
ions. In addition, carriers were reluctant to submit disci-
plinary cases to the arbitration boards, so a backlog of
grievances began to develop. In order to solve these
problems and to preserve the integrity of the RLA, the
Act was amended in 1934 to ensure that employees had
freedom of choice in determining who the representative
would be, and to ensure that there was a system for the
adjustment of grievances. The RLA was amended to in-
clude the following provision, which remains part of the
law today, setting forth the purposes of the act:
(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the oper-
ation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limi-
tation upon freedom of association among employees or
any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of
the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to
provide for the complete independence of carriers and of
employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out
9 Unlike the RLA, the NLRA specifically recognizes and preserves the right to
strike:
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or
qualifications on that right.
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
10 Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 565-66
(1930).
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the purposes of orderly settlement of all disputes concern-
ing rates of pay, rules or working conditions; (4) to pro-
vide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; and
(5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all
disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpre-
tation or application of agreements covering rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions."
As the Supreme Court observed, it could not be clearer
that "the major purpose of Congress in passing the Rail-
way Labor Act was 'to provide machinery to prevent
strikes.' "12
In 1936, when there was still a question as to the consti-
tutionality of the NLRA, Congress amended the RLA to
include air carriers within the scope of coverage.' 3
Although there are differences in the method of the ad-
justment of grievances, the same procedures for negotiat-
H 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1988). While the legislative history concerning the last
four provisions is considerable, there is almost no mention of the reason for in-
cluding the first provision. There can be no doubt, however, that it strongly rein-
forces the desire to avoid strikes.
Unlike the RLA, the NLRA is not designed primarily to prohibit strikes. The
purposes of the NLRA are set forth in the following section:
(b) Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of com-
merce and with the full production of articles and commodities for
commerce, can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers,
employees, and labor organizations each recognize relations with
each other, and above all recognize under law that neither party has
any right in its relations with any other to engage in acts or practices
which jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest.
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote
the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both
employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to
provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interfer-
ence by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the
rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organiza-
tions whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe prac-
tices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce
and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of
the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988).
12 Texas & NO. R.R., 281 U.S. at 565 (citation omitted).
13 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1988).
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ing agreements and the same desire to avoid interruption
of service apply to the airline industry.
III. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
The right of employees in the private sector to strike is
universally recognized as one of the greatest economic
weapons available to labor and one that receives statutory
protection.' 4 It is the quid pro quo for the employer's
ability to implement new terms and conditions of employ-
ment when negotiations prove unsuccessful. That right,
however, is not absolute. In particular, throughout the
years a theory has developed that denies employees who
engage in sporadic striking the protections of the NLRA.
In order to determine whether and how that theory
should apply to RLA labor disputes, it is necessary to un-
derstand fully the background and development of that
theory under the NLRA.
A. THE NLRA
An intermittent or partial strike, sometimes called a
"quickie" strike, does not receive the protection afforded
the typical strike, where workers walk off the job and stay
off. Therefore, an intermittent striker will not be entitled
to the same statutory protection afforded regular strik-
ers.' Under the NLRA, employers may discipline, and
even discharge, employees who engage in intermittent or
partial strikes.' 6
14 See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 384-85 (1969).
15 See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 427 U.S. 132, 148-49 (1976); NLRB v. G.A.I.U. Local 13-B, 682 F.2d
304 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983); Excavation Constr. v. NLRB,
660 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir. 1981); Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 159 F.2d
280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 758 (1947).
16 Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 427 U.S. at 148-49; see also NLRB v. Insur-
ance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). In addition, union coercion of
employees in connection with an intermittent strike may constitute an unfair labor
practice under Section 8(b)(1)(A). 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1988). See G.A.LU.
Local 13-B, 682 F.2d at 308; Graphic Communication Workers, 272 N.L.R.B.
1088, 1094 (1981). Since the RLA does not contain explicit unfair labor act prac-
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One of the first NLRA cases to analyze the status of re-
current striking was American Manufacturing Concern. 7 In
American Manufacturing the union demanded that the em-
ployer reduce the existing 45-hour week to a 40-hour
week. In support of its demand, the union instructed its
150 bargaining unit employees to walk off the job one
hour before the normal quitting time each day. After
learning about this plan, the employer posted notices stat-
ing that the workday did not end before 4:30 p.m. and
that any employee leaving the plant without permission
during working hours would be discharged. On that day
and the next four consecutive working days, several em-
ployees walked out of the plant before the shift was over
without permission, each intending to return for work on
the following day. Each day, the employer discharged the
employees who left work early. A general order to strike
was subsequently issued by the union.
In finding the employer's actions violative of the NLRA,
the National Labor Relations Board (Board) rejected the
argument that the walkouts did not constitute a protected
strike under the NLRA, stating:
We do not agree with the respondent in its contention that
no strike existed prior to [the general order to strike]. A
strike exists when a group of employees ceases work in or-
der to secure compliance with a demand for higher wages,
shorter hours, or other conditions of employment ....
The cessation of work by a group is no less a strike be-
cause the group itself may not have considered its action
to constitute a strike. Nor is the cessation of work any less
a strike because it occurs at the moment the work would
have ceased if the demand for the shorter working day had
been granted. Nor does the fact that the persons who
walked out desired to return the following day in order to
work for 8 hours alter the strike character of their activity,
since a refusal to work the number of hours required by an
tices it must be assumed that only injunctive relief would be available against a
union coercing employees to engage in unprotected activity. See supra text accom-
panying note 10 and infra note 79.
17 7 N.L.R.B. 753 (1938).
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employer is tantamount to an absolute refusal to work.'"
This original analysis by the Board would have pro-
tected virtually any walkout of any duration each and
every time it was reported.' 9 The courts, however, re-
fused to enforce many of the Board's early orders apply-
ing such analysis.
For example, in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. 20 the
Supreme Court reversed the Board's finding that employ-
ees had engaged in a protected work stoppage consisting
of a sitdown strike in violation of a state court injunction
against trespass and violence by the employees. In NLRB
v. Sands Manufacturing Co. 21 the Supreme Court reversed
the Board's finding that a strike in protest of the em-
ployer's decision to apply the departmental seniority pro-
visions of its contract with the union was protected. And
in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB,22 a divided Supreme
Court reversed the Board's finding that employees were
engaged in a protected strike when they refused to follow
orders while aboard ship, which arguably constituted a vi-
olation of the Federal Mutiny Act.
Lower courts also refused to enforce Board rulings
finding intermittent strikes to be protected with specific
reference to the concept of intermittent strikes. The Sev-
enth Circuit, in C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 21 resoundingly
rejected the position of the Board that employees were
engaged in protected activity where, in protest of over-
time hours and wage rates, they refused, like the employ-
", Id. at 759. The Board also held that the employer restrained employees in
violation of the NLRA by posting the warning notice "as a tactical step designed
to coerce the employees into resuming work or to deter those remaining at work
from going out on strike." Id. at 760.
19 See also The Good Coal Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 136 (1939), affd, 110 F.2d 501 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 630 (1940) (finding employer violated Section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA by discharging employees who refused to work on Labor Day, even
though there was a company rule against remaining away from work without per-.
mission); Cudahy Packing Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 837 (1941) (finding three work stop-
pages of between 10 and 20 minutes each on a single day to be protected strikes).
20 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
21 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
22 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
23 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939).
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ees in American Manufacturing, to work beyond their
regular hours. The court stated:
Undoubtedly, when [the company] refused to comply with
[the employees'] request [for an increase in overtime
rates], there were two courses open. First, they could con-
tinue to work, and negotiate further with the [employer],
or second, they could strike in protest. They did neither,
or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they at-
tempted to do both at the same time.... It seems that this
might properly be designated as a strike on the installment
plan.
We are aware of no law or logic that gives the employee
the right to work upon terms prescribed solely by him.
That is plainly what was sought to be done in this instance.
It is not a situation in which employees ceased work in
protest against conditions imposed by the employer, but
one in which employees sought and intended to continue
work upon their own notions of the terms which should
prevail. If they had a right to fix the hours of their em-
ployment, it would follow that a similar right existed by
which they could prescribe all conditions and regulations
affecting their employment. 24
In a series of cases decided in the late 1940s, the Board
began to depart from its dogmatic approach to strike ac-
tivity deemed protected by the NLRA. In Pinaud, Inc. 25
certain warehouse employees commenced a strike against
the employer. In order to continue operations during the
strike, the employer ordered one of its nonbargaining
unit employees to assist in the performance of struck
work. 6 The employee refused to perform the extra work
as she did not want to be a strikebreaker. She was dis-
charged by the employer for her refusal. The Board
found the employer's discharge of the employee for her
support of the strike violated the NLRA, but expressly
24 Id. at 397.
25 51 N.L.R.B. 235 (1943).
26 In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938), the Supreme
Court specifically acknowledged an employer's right to take reasonable steps to
ensure continued operations during an economic strike, including the right to
hire permanent replacements for the striking employees.
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noted that had the employer chosen to do so, it "was priv-
ileged, as an incident of an employer's right to replace
economic strikers, to give [the employee] an election
either to work as instructed or not to work and leave the
premises. "27
A similar result was reached by the Board in Gardner-
Denver Co.,28 which concerned a labor dispute that oc-
curred after an employee was discharged for refusing to
accept a reduction in her piece-work rate. Following the
discharge, the employer assigned the disputed work to an-
other bargaining unit employee who, in furtherance of the
union's position, left the job. The following day, the em-
ployee attempted to return, but the employer refused to
take her back on the basis that it would not rehire an em-
ployee who refused a work assignment.
The Board again found a violation of the NLRA for the
employer's refusal to reinstate a striking employee, but
specifically noted:
This is not to say, however, that . . . respondent had to
acquiesce in [the employee's] refusal to perform [the
work]. By refusing to obey the respondent's direction,
[the employee] assumed a position analogous to that of
employees who go on strike because of a labor dispute not
caused by unfair labor practices. In such a case the em-
ployer may insist that the striking employees do his bid-
ding or leave the plant, and if they refuse to obey his
direction, he is privileged to replace them in order that he
may carry on his business. The Mackay case, supra, 304
U.S. at 354. But where the striking employees apply for
reinstatement on his terms before the employer has exer-
cised his privilege of replacement, he may not deny them
reinstatement merely because they went on strike.29
These cases illustrate the development of a more re-
fined concept-while employees are absolutely free to en-
gage in a complete withholding of work, they are not
27 51 N.L.R.B. at 235-36.
28 58 N.L.R.B. 81 (1944).
- Id. at 82-83.
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privileged to engage in strike activity that is unlawful, in
violation of contract, or that constitutes an abrogation of
the right to establish the terms and conditions under
which they would work. As applied to the partial or inter-
mittent strike, this concept became more concrete be-
tween 1945 and 1955.
One of the more significant opinions is that of the
Fourth Circuit in Home Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v.
NLRB. ° In Home Beneficial the company maintained a rule
requiring its sales employees to report to their respective
offices each morning. Following a breakdown in contract
negotiations, the union notified the company that its sales
employees had voted to report to their offices only on
Wednesdays and Thursdays. Before implementing this
plan, however, the union called a strike. A number of
sales employees continued to work, but adhered to the
earlier plan to report to their offices only on Wednesdays
and Thursdays. The company subsequently terminated
all of its sales employees, which the Board found to be
improper.
In partially reversing the Board's decision, the Fourth
Circuit distinguished between those employees who
struck and those who worked according to their own
plan.3 ' As to the latter group, the Fourth Circuit relied
upon the opinion in C. G. Conn, Ltd. to find that they were
legitimately discharged for attempting to dictate the terms
under which they would work.32
Shortly after Home Beneficial was issued, the Supreme
Court decided United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board (Briggs-Stratton),3 which involved
the union's challenge to the constitutionality of a Wiscon-
sin statute that had been applied to prohibit its use of an
economic self-help measure. As described by the
Supreme Court, the
so 159 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 758 (1947).
S3 Home Beneficial, 159 F.2d at 285.
32 Id. at 286.
33 336 U.S. 245 (1949) [hereinafter Briggs-Stratton].
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stratagem consisted of calling repeated special meetings
of the Union during working hours at any time the Union
saw fit, which the employees would leave to attend. It was
an essential part of the plan that this should be without
warning to the employer or notice as to when or whether
the employees would return. 4
The union called twenty-six such meetings over a period
of approximately five months.
In rejecting the union's contention that its conduct con-
stituted protected strike activity under the NLRA, the
Court characterized the union's conduct as an "intermit-
tent unannounced stoppage of work" which in compara-
ble cases had been denied the protection of the NLRA. 5
The Court concluded, therefore, that Wisconsin was free
to regulate the union's conduct under its police powers
since no protected conduct was involved. 6
The NLRB began following and expanding upon Briggs-
Stratton in a series of cases finding partial and intermittent
strikes to constitute unprotected employee conduct. In
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. 37 the Board refused to find
that the employer violated the NLRA when it failed to re-
instate immediately certain employees who had partici-
pated in a "hit and run" work stoppage. Following a
breakdown in contract negotiations, the Communications
Workers of America (CWA), representing the traffic em-
ployees, announced in a newsletter that it would embark
on a program of repeated, short work stoppages designed
to "harass the company into a state of confusion. '3' A
fellow union, representing the employer's tollmen, ad-
vised its members in writing to honor the CWA picket
lines.
34 Id. at 249.
35 Id. at 253.
-6 Id. While Briggs-Stratton was subsequently overruled in other respects by
Lodge 76, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 427
U.S. 132 (1976), its discussion of the unprotected nature of intermittent strikes
remains vital today.
37 107 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954).
38 Id. at 1548.
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When the strike began, CWA employees in more than
200 of the employer's offices participated in the program
of sporadic refusals to work and intermittent picketing.
Wherever CWA picket lines were established, the tollmen
also refused to work. To avoid a complete disruption of
its operation, the employer formed an emergency crew of
supervisors and assigned them to work 12-hour days. As
a result of this supervisory coverage, many tollmen seek-
ing reinstatement after the cessation of picketing by the
CWA were told that they were not needed immediately
and should report to work at a later time.
In dismissing the complaint, the Board in Pacific Tele-
phone relied on Briggs-Stratton to find the CWA action was
unsupported as "a condition that would be neither strike
nor work" and was not protected. 9 Because the tollmen
joined in the unprotected strike of the traffic employees,
the employer did not violate the NLRA when it refused to
immediately reinstate them to work.
In Kohler Co. 40 the issue was whether a work stoppage in
the nature of a sick out constituted protected activity.
The employer shut down the fans in its shop as part of an
experiment to measure dust accumulation. Because of
the high heat and discomfort occasioned by the shutdown,
the employees met and voted not to complete a work shift
anytime "they felt ill or otherwise felt that they could not
'take it any longer.' ",41 They informed the employer in
writing that such would be the case until the fans were
functional.
When the fans were not turned on the next workday, 87
of the 190 employees left their shifts early to visit the
company medical department for examination. Fifty were
instructed to return to work, but only thirty-eight re-
turned. The other employees left the plant. The em-
ployer discharged those employees who left and unfair
labor practices were promptly filed against the employer.
39 Id. at 1549.
40 108 N.L.R.B. 207 (1954), enforced, 220 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1955).
41 Id. at 213.
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In rejecting the contention that the twelve employees
were engaged in a protected strike, both the Board and
the court relied on C. G. Conn to find that the employees
had not voted to strike. Rather, they had voted to engage
in a number of recurrent walkouts in support of their po-
sition. The Seventh Circuit further noted that whereas
each of the twelve employees maintained that he left the
job because he was sick, the company's medical depart-
ment showed each was fit for work. Thus "[i]f these men
were sick, it was a personal, individual matter unless it was
feigned illness to bring them within the terms of the [em-
ployees' letter of demand]. ' 2
The Court rejected the employees' contention that C. G.
Conn was distinguishable as they engaged in only a single
work stoppage rather than recurrent walkouts, noting:
[T]he letter which was sent by these men to the Company
also threatened a course of conduct on each succeeding
day until their demands were met. After receiving such
information it was not necessary for the Company to keep
the men on the payroll until they had repeatedly refused
to finish working their shifts.43
The Board issued other noteworthy decisions shortly
after Kohler, including Valley City Furniture Co. ,44 which in-
volved a union plan to refuse to work overtime until the
employer agreed to negotiate over other matters. When
informed of the union's plan to cease work at 3:30 p.m.
that day and each day thereafter, company representatives
told employees that they would be expected to work the
entire scheduled shift which was to end at 4:30 p.m. A
number of employees ignored this instruction and walked
out at 3:30 p.m.
On the following morning, the employees who left early
were refused admittance to the job unless they agreed to
submit to personal interviews without the presence of a
union representative, to ensure that the employees under-
42 Id.
4.1 Id. at 210.
44 110 N.L.R.B. 1589, enforced, 230 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1956).
[59
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stood they would not be permitted to leave again at 3:30
p.m. The employees refused to meet with the employer
and were not reinstated.
In rejecting the contention that the employees were en-
gaged in a protected strike, the Board noted that the
union refused to work the overtime hours set by the em-
ployer, engaged in one work stoppage, and communi-
cated its intention to continue such tactics.45 More
importantly, the Board noted that "[n]owhere . . . does
the record reveal any change in the Union's intentions."4 6
Accordingly, the Board found that the union planned to
engage in a partial strike, which was unprotected. The
court stated, "[t]he vice in such a strike derives from two
sources. First, the Union sought to bring about a condi-
tion that would be neither strike nor work. And, second,
in doing so, the Union in effect was attempting to dictate
the terms and conditions of employment. 47
The decisions in Valley City Furniture Co., Kohler, and Pa-
cific Telephone brought the analysis of the Board more
closely in line with the opinions of the federal courts and
held partial refusals to work and plans to engage in recur-
rent work stoppages unprotected under the NLRA. The
principles established in these early cases continue to ap-
ply today.48 While the principles governing these cases
have remained fairly constant, they are not necessarily
easily applied. In part, this is due to presumption that a
4- Id. at 1594.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 1594-95; see also Roseville Dodge, Inc. v. NLRB, 882 F.2d 1355, 1359
(8th Cir. 1989) (noting employees are not protected when they seek to draw
wages while putting economic pressure on their employer).
"I See, e.g., Excavation Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir. 1981)
(involving agreement among employees not to work weekends unless overtime
was paid); Highlands Hosp. Corp., 278 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1986) (involving refusal by
security guards to perform regularly assigned maintenance duties); Audubon
Health Care Ctr., 268 N.L.R.B. 135 (1983) (involving refusal by nurses' aides to
perform objectionable portion of their regular patient care duties); John S. Swift
Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 394 (1959), enforced, 277 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1960) (involving
refusals to work overtime pursuant to union announced plan); Honolulu Rapid
Transit Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806 (1954) (involving a refusal to work weekends dur-
ing a 2'/2 month period).
1994] 881
882 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
single, concerted refusal to work is a protected strike.49
This presumption may be rebutted only with evidence
demonstrating that the stoppage is part of an intermittent
or partial job action that is inconsistent with the genuine
performance by the employees of their normal work du-
ties. Thus, absent evidence to the contrary, a walkout by
employees for a period of one day or less is presumed to
be a protected strike.5 °
InJohnnie Johnson Tire Co."' the administrative law judge
discussed the concept of partial or recurrent strikes in the
context of rejecting the employer's claim that its employ-
ees were engaged in such an unprotected work stoppage:
A partial strike involves employees refusing to work but
remaining in their work areas or withholding their labor
from certain portions of their work while continuing to
perform other portions. The latter situation occurred in
the Audubon case. A strike may also be deemed to be a
partial one if its intermittent and recurrent .... The ac-
tions of the employees herein do not fall into any of these
categories. The work stoppage here was a one time affair
of very short duration. There was no effort by the employ-
ees to dictate to the employer what portions of their job
duties they would perform. Moreover, there is no evi-
dence that the employees intended the short work stop-
page to be an initial step in further intermittent and
recurring work stoppages. Also, there was no pattern of
prior work stoppages shown which would indicate that the
work stoppage here was partial in nature. I therefore find
that the work stoppage here was not a partial strike and
49 See, e.g., Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 696 (1972).
- See NLRB v. Gulf-Wandes Corp., 595 F.2d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1979) (find-
ing six employees who refused to work overtime on a Saturday engaged in con-
certed activity "directed at changing employer working conditions" and were
protected from discharge); Shelly & Anderson Furniture Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 497
F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding employer violated the NLRA by locking out 33
employees who engaged in a protected, peaceful 10 to 15 minute protest of em-
ployer's bargaining position at the beginning of the shift); NLRB v. Buzza-Car-
dozo, 205 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1953) (holding employees who notified the company
that they would walk off the job the following day in protest of a bonus-incentive
wage plan instituted by the employer were protected by the NLRA).
.1 271 N.L.R.B. 293 (1984).
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was not unprotected.52
Apart from the presumed protected nature of strike ac-
tivity, the partial/recurrent strike cases have become diffi-
cult due to the fact-intensive nature of the necessary
inquiries. For example, in NLRB v. Blades Manufacturing
Corp.,S the Board and the Eighth Circuit disagreed with
respect to the status to be accorded three walkouts occa-
sioned by the employer's unlawful refusal to discuss em-
ployee grievances with the union, rather than the
employees themselves. The record revealed that the
walkouts occurred immediately following three distinct in-
cidents in which the employer refused to discuss separate
grievances filed by each of the three employees.
The administrative law judge had found the activity to
be unprotected recurrent striking under Briggs-Stratton.
The Board, however, disagreed and reversed the adminis-
trative law judge. In so doing, the Board distinguished
Briggs-Stratton on the basis that the walkouts there were
unannounced and of much greater frequency.54 It further
noted that in Blades the employer had an opportunity to
bargain in good faith before each instance and could have
avoided the walkouts. 55
In denying enforcement of the Board's order, the
Eighth Circuit focused on the factual findings of the ad-
ministrative law judge. It recited four of the findings that,
in its' view, mandated a conclusion that the employees'
walkouts were part of an intermittent strike:
(1) The Union's letter admitting past concerted activity
at the time the Company was complaining of production
slowdowns and warning of future concerted activities by
the employees unles s the Company recognized the Union;
(2) A recommendation by the Union organizer at a union
meeting that the employees "walk out for a day" to get the
Company to curtail its issuance of disciplinary warning
52 Id. at 295.
53 144 N.L.R.B. 561 (1964), enforcement denied, 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965).
- Id. at 566.
55 Id.
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slips and layoffs or thereby obtain adjustment of these
grievances with the Union;
(3) The employees agreeing in advance to walk out for
the remainder of the shift each time the Company refused
to recognize the Union and adjust a grievance on a collec-
tive basis; and
(4) An employee's admission to his supervisor that he
was not "putting out a day's work" until the Company rec-
ognized the Union plus other credited evidence of pro-
duction slowdowns during this period.56
As evidenced by the differing interpretations of the
facts in Blades, whether a strike is protected or unpro-
tected is a decision based on an analysis of all available
evidence. Nevertheless, in First National Bank of Omaha,57
the administrative law judge attempted to distill from the
cases the essential ingredients generally used in each anal-
ysis. First National Bank of Omaha concerned the concerted
refusal of five bank employees to remain at work until
7:00 p.m., the end of the shift. They left the job one-half
hour early and were discharged the following morning by
the bank. In finding that the employees' walkout was a
protected strike rather than an intermittent work stop-
page, the administrative law judge began the analysis by
recognizing that a single strike of limited duration is pro-
tected under the NLRA. 58 He distinguished this situation
from unprotected strikes, however, on the basis that in
those cases employees engaging in unprotected activity
attempted to "simultaneously walk off their jobs but re-
tain the benefits of working."59 Even more importantly,
however, the administrative law judge relied heavily on
the fact that the bank discharged the striking employees
before ascertaining whether they intended to strike again
and without warning them of the consequences of their
actions, which seemed to introduce an entirely new evi-
dentiary issue to be analyzed in such cases. After canvass-
-6 NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 988, 1005 (8th Cir. 1965).
57 171 N.L.R.B. 1145 (1968), enforced, 413 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1969).
58 Id. at 1151.
59 Id.
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ing the major Board decisions in the area, the
administrative law judge commented:
In Swift, as in Valley City and Honolulu Rapid Transit, the em-
ployer was aware that the employees had decided to adopt
the tactics of recurrent or intermittent walkouts as a means
of forcing concessions in bargaining. In all three cases,
also, the employees had been warned that continuance of
such a tactic would bring about the use of counter-meas-
ures designed to blunt the pressures being brought to
bear. I believe that these were the critical elements in all
three cases, and that the absence of one or both might well
have produced a different result.60
Both the Board and the Eighth Circuit approved the ad-
ministrative law judge's analysis, though neither com-
mented specifically on his determination of which were
the "critical elements" in their current strike cases. The
decided cases, however, make apparent that the Board
and the courts do not require that employees first be
warned as to the possibility of discipline for engaging in
unprotected strike activity as a prerequisite to discharging
employees engaged in an unprotected strike.6 '
In sustaining the Board's order in First National Bank of
Omaha, however, the Eighth Circuit rejected the Board's
suggestion that the employer had an obligation, either to
clarify what the employees intended, or to warn them
about the consequences of their actions before discharg-
ing them. But, the Eighth Circuit did comment on the dif-
ficult nature of determining whether a strike is entitled to
the protections of the NLRA, particularly in the context of
an overtime dispute, stating:
- Id. at 1150.
61 The administrative law judge's softened interpretation of the "unprotected
strike" cases was occasioned by his review of the concurring opinion in Honolulu
Rapid Transit, in which two of the four members reviewing the employer's conduct
in suspending recurrent strikers declined to decide "that any given form of unpro-
tected strike activity gives the employer license to engage in any and all forms of
retaliatory or unlawfully motivated discrimination." 110 N.L.R.B. at 1812-13
(footnote omitted). This dicta has not been utilized to hold an employer liable for
the discharge or discipline of an unprotected striker in other cases.
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We recognize the difficulty of drawing a line between pro-
tected and unprotected activity in such situations. The
task is even more difficult when the walkout occurs at or
near the end of a regular day, and the employees return to
work the next morning. The line is one which must never-
theless be drawn. Employees have the same right to en-
gage in concerted activity to bring about a change in
overtime policy as they do to bring about a change in
wages or other working conditions. They have as much
right to strike on this issue as any other, and they are not
required to institute the strike at any particular time of the
day or to maintain it for any particular period of time to be
entitled to the protection of the Act. The test in each case
is whether the employees have assumed the status of strik-
ers. They cannot continue to work the regular hours of
employment and refuse to work overtime.62
Cases following First National Bank of Omaha have recog-
nized the difficulty in determining whether a work stop-
page constitutes a protected or a partial or intermittent
strike. In NLRB v. Leprino Cheese Co. 63 the court rejected
the contention that unorganized employees were engaged
in an unprotected partial strike because they punched out
early on Christmas day, rather than working the long day
scheduled by the company. In so doing, the court ac-
knowledged the fact that the employees intended to re-
turn to work the following morning required application
of the line of cases holding that an employee may not
choose his own working conditions under the guise of a
strike.64 Nevertheless, the court found determinative the
fact that the employees were discharged immediately
upon leaving the work place on Christmas, and, conse-
quently, that their intent to return the following day was
not, under the circumstances, sufficient to make the walk-
out a partial strike.65
62 First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 413 F.2d at 925.
63 424 F.2d 184 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 915 (1970).
64 Id. at 186.
65 Id.
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In NLRB v. Robertson Industries66 the Ninth Circuit ex-
amined the question of whether two one-day work stop-
pages within a three-month period were sufficient to
support a finding of an intermittent strike. The record re-
vealed that in November of 1973, fifteen to twenty of the
employer's unorganized employees ceased work to pro-
test being overworked. The employees returned to work
after the employer threatened to discharge them. In Feb-
ruary of 1974, a number of the employees, including
some night-shift employees, failed to come to work in or-
der to attend a union organizational meeting at which sev-
eral topics, including the employees' adverse working
conditions, were discussed. The employer fired all the
employees who were absent from work.
In sustaining the Board's finding that the employer had
violated the NLRA, the Ninth Circuit rejected the em-
ployer's contention that the employees' strike was an un-
protected, intermittent work stoppage.6 7 Relying on Shelly
&Anderson Furniture,68 the court found that "[t]wo one-day
work stoppages in three months do not give rise to a re-
peated pattern of half-strikes." 69 The court also noted the
evidence supported the Board's conclusion that the union
meeting was called to address the employees' dissatisfac-
tion with working conditions, and that both day and night-
shift employees refrained from working on the date of the
union meeting (which took place during day-shift working
hours).70 The timing and content of the meeting gave
credence to the finding that the employees were striking
over the employer's conduct, rather than simply taking off
work to attend a union meeting, which would not have, in
and of itself, constituted a protected activity.71
66 560 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1976).
67 Id. at 399.
" 497 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1974); see supra note 46.
66 Robertson, 560 F.2d at 399.
70 Id.
71 Id. The Eighth Circuit also took note of the criteria required for protection
of concerted activity established in Shelly & Anderson:
In order to be protected ... the concerted activity must satisfy the
following elements:
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Another significant case is NLRB v. Lasaponara & Sons,
Inc.,72 where the employer was held to have violated the
NLRA by discharging six employees who refused to work
on the religious holiday of Palm Sunday, a very active
business day for the employer.73 Prior to the holiday, the
employees gave the employer a petition signed by twenty
employees protesting the need to work on the holiday.
The employer refused to give the employees the day off.
When six employees failed to report on Palm Sunday, the
employer took no immediate action, but two months later
discharged them for their refusal to work.
In rejecting the employer's contention that it was free
to discharge those employees for their refusal to work on
Palm Sunday, the court stated:
The one day strike or work stoppage by the discharged
employees in support of their petition protesting the Palm
Sunday schedule is statutorily protected because it consti-
tuted concerted activity aimed at changing working condi-
tions at the plant. While the strike undoubtedly brought
inconvenience and economic loss to the Company in view
of its unusually heavy production schedule due to the
Easter season, such a result is obviously the very object of
any concerted employee action protected by the Act.
Although it is true that not all concerted employee activi-
ties are protected by Section 7, the economic pressure
brought to bear here, unlike that present in the narrow
class of cases relied on by respondents, clearly failed to
reach a degree so grossly disproportionate to the goal
sought to be achieved that it renders the conduct unpro-
tected and thereby justifies discharge of the participating
(1) there must be a work-related complaint or grievance; (2) the con-
certed activity must further some group interest; (3) a specific rem-
edy or result must be sought through such activity; and (4) the
activity should not be unlawful or otherwise improper.
560 F.2d at 398-99 (quoting Shelly &Anderson, 497 F.2d at 1202-03).
In addition, the Board has held an employee's refusal to come to work merely
to attend a union meeting is unprotected conduct. Gulf Coast Oil Co., 97
N.L.R.B. 1513, 1515 (1952).
72 541 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 914 (1977).
73 Id. at 997-99.
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74employees.
From an examination of the foregoing authorities, the
following principles emerge with respect to when a work
stoppage should be protected or not under the NLRA:
1. The Board's initial reaction was to permit partial
and intermittent strikes, yet it was forced to alter that po-
sition after the courts determined such activity was not
protected.
2. No statutory prohibition of partial or intermittent
strikes exists. Rather, the unprotected status is based
upon the finding that partial or intermittent strikes are
not consistent with the philosophy of putting economic
pressure on an employer through withholding the eco-
nomic benefits of work performed.
3. A concerted stoppage of work by employees is pre-
sumed to be protected under the NLRA until, or unless, it
is found to be for an improper objective, or is conducted
in a manner deemed unlawful, in breach of contract, or
otherwise indefensible.
4. A one-time strike, consisting of a complete cessa-
tion of work by the employees, is also presumptively pro-
tected whether the strike is of brief duration (e.g., ten to
fifteen minutes) or continues over a more substantial pe-
riod of time.
5. While employees are free to engage in a total cessa-
tion of their work to accomplish legitimate bargaining or
other objectives, they are not protected if they pick and
choose among the terms of employment that they will
honor and those that they will refuse to perform as struck
work. In other words, employees cannot expect to be
paid for striking.
6. An employee will generally be found to be engag-
ing in unprotected activity if the cessation of work is, or
will be, pursuant to a plan of action calling for repeated
work stoppages in furtherance of some concerted or
union objective.
74 Id. at 998 (citations omitted).
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7. The mere fact that employees have struck on more
than one occasion during the period of a labor dispute is
not, in and of itself, sufficient to show a recurrent strike.
Where employees have sufficient independent grounds
for calling more than one strike action in a relatively short
period of time, the actions will be presumed to be pro-
tected, independent work stoppages.
8. Where the circumstances demonstrate that the ac-
tivity has been, or will be, recurrent, an employer is justi-
fied in treating the strike as employee misconduct subject
to discipline.
Overall, it is clear that while the right to call one or
more quick or short duration strikes clearly exists in ap-
propriate circumstances, once the right accrues, it should
be fully exercised, completely and absolutely to protest an
employer's actions.75
B. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The application of the intermittent strike doctrine to
the RLA first requires an analysis of how labor organiza-
tions gain the right to exercise self-help. In the context of
major disputes,7 6 the right to strike during the self-help
period is the inevitable alternative in a statutory scheme
that deliberately denies the final power to compel arbitra-
tion of a major dispute." The right to strike under the
RLA, however, is similar to that under the NLRA in that it
is not an unrestricted right.
The right to exercise self-help under the RLA does not
ripen as quickly as under the NLRA. Under the NLRA,
11 An employer may choose to treat an intermittent striker the same as any
other striker and hire a permanent replacement employee rather than disciplining
the intermittent striker. See, e.g., Association of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Air-
lines, No. C93-912R, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18938. (W.D. Wash. Dec. 29, 1993).
16 There are three types of disputes under the RLA. "Major" disputes involve
changes in the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions for represented employ-
ees. "Minor" disputes involve the adjustment of grievances. The third category is
"omitted" disputes, which are neither "major" nor "minor" disputes. Elgin, J. &
E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1945).
77 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
379-80 (1969).
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once an agreement expires, if the parties are at impasse
they are free to engage in self-help. This procedure does
not apply under the RLA, as, pursuant to the Section 6
process under the RLA, the parties are required to ex-
haust procedures that are "long and drawn out, based on
the hope that reason and practical considerations will pro-
vide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute."7
The primary objective of the RLA is "to prevent, if possi-
ble, wasteful strikes and interruptions of interstate com-
merce." 79 As a corollary, at the other end of that "long
and drawn out" process, after the procedures of the RLA
have been exhausted, to permit an open-ended self-help
right would collide with the primary purpose of the
RLA.80
If a strike would, if called immediately after termination
of the statutory procedure, be permissible, a strike con-
ducted at a considerable temporal distance from the com-
pletion of those procedures may violate the RLA.
Although the precedent in this area is less than consistent,
one principle emerges from the case law. 8 ' This principle
is that exhaustion of the RLA's procedures does not give a
union a perpetual right to strike that continues, regardless
of whether circumstances have changed during the time
that has elapsed since the release from mediation. 2
Probably the most elegant statement of this principle
was made by Judge Moore in the dissenting opinion in
Pan American:
78 Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 246
(1966).
79 Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148 (1969).
so In addition, even when the right to strike has accrued, it may be subject to
reasonable limitations, such as providing appropriate notice to the employer of
the intention to strike, before it may be exercised. Delaware & H.R.R. v. United
Transp. Union, 450 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971).
81 Compare Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 413 F. Supp. 681
(E.D. Mich. 1976) (preventing long, wasteful strikes), with Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1962) (proceeding
through Section 6 does not create a perpetual "strike coupon").
82 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Southern Ry., 393 F.2d 303, 309 (5th
Cir. 1968); Detroit & T.S.L.R.R., 413 F. Supp. at 686.
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The mere fact that a proceeding based upon Section 6 no-
tices in April, 1960, has gone through the various pre-
scribed steps should not entitle the flight engineers to
receive one "strike coupon" good in perpetuity which may
be dusted off and redeemed at will in future years by a
strike regardless of the then situation and the specific con-
troversies then dividing the parties.8"
After the implementation of new terms by a carrier,
significant changes will alter the relationship between the
carrier and union. Most importantly, such a case would
be the quintessential example of changed circumstances if
the union acquiesces to those changes made by the car-
rier. Based upon that fact, it would be logical to argue
that the dispute has come to an end, and the right to
strike no longer exists.
If a union waits a considerable period after implementa-
tion to strike, the union should be enjoined on the basis
that it has relinquished its right to strike through inaction.
Generally, unions either strike shortly after completion of
the required procedures or they do not strike. In cases
where a strike is delayed for a substantial amount of time
after the self-help period begins, there is invariably a com-
pelling explanation. Often the explanation is that the car-
rier also has not resorted to self-help, typically pursuant
to a moratorium agreement, in which both sides agree not
to resort to self-help while they continue to negotiate. 84
Since such agreements include the parties' mutual reser-
vation of their rights, resort to self-help upon the expira-
tion of the moratorium is clearly permissible.
The issue of whether one party, in the absence of an
agreement, may lose its right of self-help through inaction
and conduct designed to lead the other party to rely on its
decision not to strike was addressed in Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.85 In that
83 Pan American, 306 F.2d at 852.
84 See, e.g., REA Express, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 358
F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Erie Lackawanna Ry. v. Lighter Captains Union,
338 F. Supp. 955 (D.NJ. 1972).
85 179 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Pa. 1959); see also Detroit & T.S.L.R.R., 413 F. Supp.
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case, the carrier faced a notice of a general strike approxi-
mately three and one-half months into the self-help pe-
riod. The court found the delay not unreasonable, but
noted that, at some point, the right to strike must end:
It is conceivable that an "old" dispute involving the same
set of facts could become a "new" dispute if one or both
of the parties slept on the rights (in this instance the right
to strike) for a considerable period of time. Laches could
bar the pleas or previous mediation. To allow the inter-
ruption of a vital public service with in fact no warning
could cause great harm to those dependent on the service.
But to hold that the strike must be called on the exact ex-
piration date of the provisions of the Act would also be
against public policy. Continuation of negotiations for a
reasonable period should be encouraged. Here we find no
unreasonable delay on the part of the Union so as to make
this dispute subject to a new enforcement of the proce-
dures of the Act. 6
at 686 (holding that after 11/2 years of unilaterally implemented computerization,
during which the union did not strike, the union lost its right to strike over an
issue that had unquestionably been the subject of prior mediation and release).
86 Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 179 F. Supp. at 277-78. The RLA provides no express
limitation period within which a carrier, or a union, must exercise self-help rights,
or be deemed to have lost them. However, a logical argument exists to adopt the
prevailing limitations period for most federal labor issues, namely the six-month
bar contained in Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1988); see DelCostello v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151
(1983) (holding the six month limitation period applied to duty of fair representa-
tion suits).
Following the Court's ruling in DelCostello, a number of courts applied the six-
month limitations period to cases under the RLA. See, e.g., International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 790 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 931 (1986); Robinson v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
777 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1985) (expressly adopting the DelCostello limitation period in
a case by airline employees alleging that they were discharged for their pro-union
activities in violation of the RLA); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchi-
son, T.& S.F. Ry., 768 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying DelCostello to an alleged
refusal to bargain under Section 2 of the Act); Dozier v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 760 F.2d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 1985); United Indep. Flight Officers v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1985); Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686, 689
(1st Cir. 1984); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358, 363-64 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984); Sisco v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 732 F.2d 1188
(3d Cir. 1984) (applying a six-month limitation for duty of fair representation
claims).
Accordingly, a strong argument exists that the right to strike under the RLA
could terminate if not exercised within six months of release.
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In addition to losing the right to engage in protected
activity, clearly there are certain activities, such as wildcat
strikes, slowdowns, and strikes before the negotiation
procedures are completed, that receive no protection
under the RLA: "While [the RLA] contains no express
prohibition against strikes, it has been construed by nu-
merous courts, including the Supreme Court, to impliedly
prohibit strikes in various situations, though not in all."18 7
From these cases and principles, the following state-
ments can be made about the right to strike under the
RLA:
1. The major purpose of the RLA is to provide mech-
anisms for the adjustment of all disputes, both grievances
and negotiation of new agreements, which avoids, to the
maximum extent possible, strikes by labor organizations.
2. The right to strike does "expire," thus recognizing
the policy favoring the maintenance of agreements be-
tween the parties.
3. Not all strikes are protected under the RLA.
4. Violations of the RIA may be enjoined by federal
courts.
5. If a strike is not protected, a carrier may obtain in-
junctive relief to prohibit employees from engaging in the
unprotected strike.
Once the NLRA principles regarding intermittent and
partial strikes are applied in the RLA context, it should be
clear that such strikes are not permitted under the RLA
and should be prevented through the use of injunctive re-
lief. When there is no clear answer to an issue under the
RLA, the Supreme Court has condoned turning to the
87 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Bass, 328 F. Supp. 732, 746 (W.D. Ky. 1971) (citations
omitted) (holding employees engaged in an unlawful wildcat strike); see also Long
Island R.R. v. System Fed'n No. 156, 289 F. Supp. 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)
(holding employee slowdown violated RLA); 45 U.S.C. § 354(a-2)(iii) (1988),
which provides that employees engaging in strikes that violate the provisions of
the RLA are not entitled to unemployment benefits. The statute was passed in
1938, with the prohibition originally codified at § 355(0. Clearly, since shortly
after passage of the 1934 amendments, Congress has believed that certain strikes
violate the RLA.
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NLRA "for assistance in construing" the RLA. 88 Applica-
tion of any NLRA provision, however, requires analysis of
both the statutory provisions and the purposes behind
each statute.
On the issue of intermittent strikes, it should be noted
that the RLA has a much stronger policy of prohibiting
strikes. In fact, the NLRA specifically protects the right to
strike, while the RLA does not even contain the word
"strike." 89 Therefore, to the extent that a partial or inter-
mittent strike interrupts commerce and the carrier's abil-
ity to operate, such strikes would fly in the face of the
statutory purpose of "avoid[ing] any interruption to com-
merce or to the operation of any carrier engaged
therein. "90
Under the NLRA, as set forth above, the policy against
intermittent strikes is based upon the principle that such
strikes are not consistent with the philosophy of putting
economic pressure on an employer by not receiving the
economic benefits of working employees. In the RLA
context, the balancing of the rights between employers
and employees is not the critical inquiry. Rather the "pri-
mary consideration ... [is] the public need for a reliable,
safe, and convenient transportation service. ' 'g
As the public learned during the 1993 American Air-
lines labor dispute, a strike can have devastating effects on
a nationwide transportation system. Even after the strike
concluded, it took the carrier several days to put its sys-
tem back in order to operate at 100%. Just imagine what
the effect could have been if the flight attendants had
been able to strike on every third day. Such intermittent
activity would clearly have impinged upon the public need
for an efficient transportation system. Therefore, holding
- Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
383 (1969).
89 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
go 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1988).
91 Long Island R.R., 289 F. Supp. at 126.
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intermittent strikes to be unprotected has more support
under the RLA than under the NLRA.
Based upon the statutory purposes of the RLA, one
would assume that intermittent or partial strikes would be
unprotected under the RLA. As such, a carrier con-
fronted with this kind of activity should be entitled to in-
junctive relief to stop such activities. Unfortunately,
without engaging in much analysis, at least two courts
have held that intermittent activity is permissible under
the RLA.92
IV. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Unlike the NLRA, there is no administrative agency
charged with enforcement and interpretation of the RLA.
Therefore, the federal courts have been charged with this
duty.93 Also unlike the NLRA, there have been very few
instances under the RLA in which employees have at-
tempted to engage in partial or intermittent strikes.
Thus, it is especially important that the courts understand
the judicial history of the RLA and the rationale for the
NLRA decisions in this area, and then apply that under-
standing to their rulings.
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters 4 the Second Circuit held that Pan Am
was not entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) from engaging in
intermittent work stoppages. 5 The IBT obtained the
right to strike against Pan Am on February 21, 1988. No
action was taken, however, until June 29, 1989, when the
92 See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 894 F.2d
36 (2d Cir. 1990), infra notes 89-106 and accompanying text; Association of Flight
Attendants v. Alaska Airlines, No. C93-912R, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18938, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 29, 1993), infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employ-
ees, 481 U.S. 429, 448 (1987) (noting that one difference between the RLA and
the NLRA is that employers subject to the NLRA cannot seek injunctive relief for
statutory violations as the National Labor Relations Board is provided with that
authority).
-4 894 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1990).
95 Id. at 37.
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"IBT began a series of intermittent job actions at various
Pan Am facilities consisting primarily of hour-long work
stoppages for union employee meetings and
assemblies. '"96
Unlike most of the NLRA cases, this one did not require
intensive factual inquiry to determine if the employees
were engaging in an intermittent strike action. It is clear
that such actions were contemplated and undertaken by
the union. As noted in NLRA cases, the IBT was attempt-
ing to create a situation that was neither strike nor work,
which clearly constitutes unprotected activity under the
NLRA. Accordingly, the court only analyzed whether
such activity was protected, not whether it was
intermittent.
The court first held that a new status quo had not been
created by the mere passage of time, even though sixteen
months passed between accrual of the right to strike and
the exercise of that right:
The RLA, however, does not include a time limit within
which either party must use or lose its right to self-help.
The courts have no business making up such a limit out of
thin air, and they have even less reason to adopt a rule that
may tilt the balance of economic power in favor of one
party.97
The court did not acknowledge or attempt to distinguish
those cases finding that the right to strike could indeed be
waived if not exercised within a reasonable amount of
96 Id. at 38.
97 Id. at 40. The court continued, "[b]ecause only the employer can impose
unilateral terms and conditions of employment, the establishment of a new status
quo requiring exhaustion of 'major dispute' procedures would seem, under Pan
Am's theory, to lie largely in the carriers' hands." Id. Unfortunately, this analysis
makes very little sense, since the court held that the union's right to strike never
expires. Id. at 36. It is difficult, therefore, to fathom how the employer could
unilaterally establish a new status quo if it could not do so by operating under new
terms and conditions of employment for sixteen months. The only explanation
must be that if the carrier had not implemented the changes, the right to strike
would not have accrued. Such a theory, however, has no logical basis in the
statute.
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time.98 In addition, there is absolutely no recognition of
the fact that the RLA was designed to avoid strikes, en-
courage agreement, and, whenever possible, avoid disrup-
tion of transportation systems.
The court also implied that there was no manner in
which it could establish an appropriate time limit. As set
forth above, however, courts have almost universally im-
ported the six month statute of limitations from the
NLRA cases to RLA cases. Therefore, in finding that the
union had waived its right to strike after six months, the
court would not be "making up such a limit out of thin
air" 99 and could have legally justified such a time limit.
Second, the court refused to import the NLRA princi-
ples on intermittent and partial strikes for three reasons:
(1) injunctive relief was prohibited by the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act;100 (2) the RLA did not have an agency that could
create a rule against intermittent strikes; and (3) intermit-
tent strikes were not unfair labor practices under the
NLRA. Those reasons, however, fail to recognize the pur-
poses of the RLA and the interplay between the NLRA
and RLA.
With regard to the Norris-LaGuardia argument, the
Second Circuit misplaced its reliance upon Burlington
Northern Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees.' 0' That case concerned whether secondary
strike activity was prohibited by the RLA. Unlike the
NLRA, the RLA does not portend to be an all encompass-
ing regulation of labor management relations in the rail-
road and airline industries. Rather, it is concerned
primarily with the adjustment of disputes between a car-
rier and its employees. The NLRA, on the other hand,
contains many limitations on the relationships between
unions and employers, even when the unions do not rep-
resent any of an employer's employees. In particular, the
98 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
" Pan Am, 894 F.2d at 40.
1- 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988).
10, 481 U.S. 429 (1987).
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NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice, in certain narrow
circumstances, to engage in secondary picketing. 0 2
There is no prohibition against secondary activity in the
RLA, nor is there any hint that the statute is intended to
apply to relations concerning other employers. Applica-
tion of that NLRA principle was therefore not warranted.
Thus, the Second Circuit's reliance upon Burlington North-
ern to support the argument that Norris-LaGuardia pro-
hibits the issuance of an injunction is misplaced.
As set forth above, judicial enforcement is the only
method for enforcement of RLA duties and obligations. 0 3
In addition, that enforcement extends to the issuance of
injunctions in order to prevent strikes which violate the
RLA. 10 4 The Second Circuit failed to acknowledge that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act specifically recognizes the abil-
ity of courts to issue injunctions when "unlawful acts have
been threatened and will be committed unless re-
strained."' 1 5 Therefore, if the strike were an unlawful ex-
ercise of self-help, Norris-LaGuardia would not prohibit
the issuance of an injunction. 0 6 As set forth below, how-
ever, the intermittent strike should have been considered
unlawful under the RLA, which would authorize the issu-
ance of injunctive relief.
In addition, if a carrier can demonstrate that the strike
does or would violate other provisions of the RLA, it may
also be enjoined. Prior to the beginning of the Eastern
Airlines/IAM strike in 1989, many unions announced that
they would engage in secondary strikes in support of the
unions at Eastern. In response to those announcements,
many carriers obtained injunctions prohibiting secondary
strikes until a determination was made, pursuant to the
applicable arbitration provisions, as to whether sympathy
102 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988).
103 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
-04 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
105 29 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1988).
106 See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Teamsters Airline Div., 874 F.2d 110, 113-
14 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that secondary strike activity may be enjoined if the
primary strike to which it relates is unlawful).
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strikes were permissible under the no-strike clause."°7
The courts determined that permitting a sympathy strike
could damage the minor dispute resolution mechanism
required by the RLA; therefore, it would be unlawful for
the unions to strike without first obtaining a decision on
the application of the n o-strike clause from the appropri-
ate arbitration board.
Another reason espoused by the Second Circuit in Pan
Am was that the "Supreme Court has emphasized.., that
NLRA principles 'cannot be imported wholesale into the
railway labor arena. Even rough analogies must be drawn
circumspectly, with due regard for the many differences
between the statutory schemes.' "o108 The only difference
noted by the court was that the NLRA provided for an
administrative agency to govern its interpretation, and it
was that agency that was responsible for the intermittent
work stoppage rule. However, it was not the Board that
originally created the rule against intermittent work stop-
pages. The Board originally held that such activity was
protected. Only after being reversed by several courts of
appeal did the Board change its opinion. 0 9 The Second
Circuit had the facts reversed, and cited no additional au-
thority for not importing the NLRA principles.
The statutory differences, when properly analyzed,
demonstrate that there is even more reason for the rule
against intermittent work stoppages to apply under the
RLA. Like the RLA, the NLRA has no express provisions
against such work stoppages. Therefore, a proper analy-
sis requires evaluation of the purposes underlying the
statute and the right to strike, which, under the RLA indi-
cate such activity should be prohibited.
107 See, e.g., Long Island R.R. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 874 F.2d 901
(2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1042 (1990); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists, 712 F. Supp. 732 (D. Minn. 1989); South E. Pa.
Transp. Auth. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 708 F.
Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa.), af'd, 882 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1989).
,08 Pan Am, 894 F.2d at 40 (citing Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969)).
-o9 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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The RLA was designed specifically to avoid strikes and
any disruption of commerce. Even if the parties do obtain
the right to exercise self-help, it comes only after a long,
drawn-out process, with many steps and the use of a third
party, designed to allow sufficient time to reach agree-
ment and avoid strikes. To allow a labor organization to
disrupt commerce frequently and intermittently is in di-
rect contravention of the stated statutory goals.
The Second Circuit's final reason for not prohibiting
the intermittent strikes was that since such action was not
an unfair labor practice, an injunction could not issue
under the NLRA. Once again, however, the court failed
to acknowledge the differences between the statutory
schemes. The Supreme Court has recognized that the dif-
ference between the RLA and the NLRA results in RLA
employers being able to seek injunctive relief that is
otherwise denied to NLRA employers due to the exist-
ence of the Board. 1 0 Since an RLA carrier could not seek
a remedy through an unfair labor practice proceeding, ap-
plying this difference to the issue of intermittent strikes
demonstrates injunctive relief must be appropriate.
Pan Am did not appeal the Second Circuit decision.
Therefore, for several years, this decision was the only
published one with regard to intermittent strikes under
the RLA. At least one other court has now adopted this
decision without questioning it or analyzing the RLA pur-
poses or principles."'
In Association of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines" 2 the
court upheld the union's use of intermittent and partial
strikes. Once again, there was no question that the activi-
ties in which the union engaged were intermittent. The
carrier argued that the activity was unprotected, while the
union argued that it was protected. The court recognized
that an employer's response depends upon whether the
110 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
- Association of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines, No. C93-912R, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18938, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 29, 1993).
112 Id. at *1; see supra discussion part I.
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activity is protected or unprotected. The court, however,
refused to decide that issue. Without performing any in-
dependent analysis, the court cited the Second Circuit's
decision and merely stated, "[s]imilarly, this court finds it
would be improvident to import such distinctions from
the NLRA into the RLA and thus declines to determine
whether the CHAOS work stoppages would be consid-
ered protected or unprotected activity under the RLA. ' " 13
Since it refused to determine whether the activities were
protected, it is difficult to understand how the court was
able to determine the legality of the carrier's actions, par-
ticularly since it held that employees could not be dis-
charged for engaging in CHAOS activity." 14
Shortly after the issuance of this opinion, Alaska Air-
lines and its flight attendants reached agreement. There-
fore, the parties will probably not appeal this decision.
The import of these two decisions on intermittent strikes
is foreboding for carriers.
The RLA labor organizations are now well aware that
the use of intermittent strikes has not been prohibited by
either court which has addressed the issue. In addition,
the organizations recognize that their activities can cause
considerable problems for carriers, particularly if the car-
rier intends to respond by replacing employees who par-
ticipate in the activity. Yet, based upon the analysis of the
RLA and its history, intermittent activity should be la-
beled as unprotected.
Carriers should continue to fight such activity, relying
upon the legislative history of the RLA to support their
position. As set forth at the beginning of this article,
many federal judges are not familiar with the provisions of
the RLA or its history. Therefore, educating judges is
necessary. In addition, carriers will bear the burden of
'I Id. at *10.
"4 The court did, however, acknowledge that the carrier had the right to per-
manently replace any employees who engaged in CHAOS behavior and that em-
ployees who had been permanently replaced could not claim entitlement to other
positions which were vacant as the result of CHAOS activity. Id. at * 16-17.
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distinguishing the previous opinions, which, given the
lack of analysis in the opinions, will require diligence in
the education process. For reasons set forth herein carri-
ers should be able to level the playing field and obtain
judicial relief against such activity. Upon a finding that
intermittent activity is not protected and is entitled to ju-
dicial relief, employees will find that engaging in such be-
havior will result in immediate discharge and will look
more like suicidal actions than protected activity.
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